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Abstract
In this paper we study the implementation challenge in an abstract interdependent values
model and an arbitrary objective function. We design a mechanism that allows for approximate
optimal implementation of insensitive objective functions in ex-post Nash equilibrium. If,
furthermore, values are private then the same mechanism is strategy proof. We cast our results
onto two specific models: pricing and facility location. The mechanism we design is optimal
up to an additive factor of the order of magnitude of one over the square root of the number of
agents and involves no utility transfers.
Underlying our mechanism is a lottery between two auxiliary mechanisms — with high
probability we actuate a mechanism that reduces players influence on the choice of the social
alternative, while choosing the optimal outcome with high probability. This is where the recent
notion of differential privacy is employed. With the complementary probability we actuate a
mechanism that is typically far from optimal but is incentive compatible. The joint mechanism
inherits the desired properties from both.
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1 Introduction
Mechanism design deals with the implementation of desired outcomes in a multi-agent system with
asymmetric information. The outcome of a mechanism may be a price for a good, an allocation
of goods to the agents, the decision on a provision of a public good, locating public facilities,
etc. The quality of the outcome is measured by some objective function. In many instances the
literature is concerned with the sum of the agents’ valuations for an outcome, but the objective
function can take many other forms, such as the revenue of a seller in an auction setting, the social
inequality in a market setting and more. The reader is referred to Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green
[19] for a broader introduction. The holy grail of the mechanism design challenge is to design
mechanisms which exhibit dominant strategies for the players, and furthermore, once players play
their dominant strategies the outcome of the mechanism coincides with maximizing the objective
function. Broadly speaking, this challenge is equivalent to designing optimal direct mechanisms
that are truthful.
As it turns out, such powerful mechanisms do not exist in general. The famous Gibbard-
Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard [14] and Satterthwaite [29]) tells us that for non-restricted settings
any non-trivial truthful mechanism is dictatorial. However, if we restrict attention to the objective
function that is simply the sum of the agents’ valuations, then this problem can be overcome
by introducing monetary payments. Indeed, in such cases the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
mechanisms, discovered by Vickrey [37] and generalized by Clarke [8] and Groves [16], guarantee
that being truthful is a dominant strategy and the outcome is optimal. Unfortunately, Roberts [26]
showed that a similar mechanism cannot be obtained for other objective functions. This cul-de-sac
induced researchers to ‘lower the bar’ for mechanism design. One possibility for lowering the bar
is to replace the solution concept with a weaker one and a large body of literature on Bayes-Nash
implementation has developed (the reader is referred to Mas-Colell et al. [19] for further reading).
Another direction is that of approximate implementation where the quest replaces accurate
implementation with approximate implementation, while keeping the approximation inaccuracy
as low as possible. The latter research agenda turned out to be fruitful and yielded many positive
results. A sequence of papers on virtual implementation, initiated by Matsushima [20] and Abreu
and Sen [2], provides general conditions for approximate implementation where the approximation
inaccuracy in a fixed model can be made arbitrarily small. On the other hand, the recent literature
emerging from the algorithmic mechanism design community looks at approximation inaccuracies
which are a function of the size of the model (measured, e.g., the number of agents).
Interestingly, no general techniques are known for designing mechanisms that are approxi-
mately optimal for arbitrary social welfare functions. To demonstrate this consider the facility
location problem, where a social planner needs to locate some facilities, based on agents’ reports
of their own location. This problem has received extensive attention recently, yet small changes in
the model result in different techniques which seem tightly tailored to the specific model assump-
tions (see Alon et al. [5], Procaccia and Tennenholtz [25] and Wang et al. [38]).
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Another line of research, initiated by Moulin [23], is that on mechanism design without money.
Moulin, and later Schummer and Vohra [32, 33], characterized functions that are truthfully im-
plementable without payments and studied domains in which non-dictatorial functions can be im-
plemented. More recently, Procaccia and Tennenholtz [25] studied a relaxation of this notion –
approximate mechanism design without money.
Our work presents a general methodology for designing approximately optimal mechanisms
for a broad range of models, including the facility location problem. A feature of our constructions
is that the resulting mechanisms do not involve monetary transfers.
1.1 Our Contribution
We introduce an abstract mechanism design model where agents have interdependent values and
provide a generic technique for approximate implementation of an arbitrary objective function.
More precisely, we bound the worst case difference between the optimal outcome (‘first best’) and
the expected outcome of our generic mechanism by O(
√
lnn
n
), where n is the population size. In
addition, our generic construction does not involve utility transfer.
Our construction combines two very different random mechanisms:
• With high probability we deploy a mechanism that chooses social alternatives with a prob-
ability that is proportional to (the exponent of) the outcome of the objective function, as-
suming players are truthful. This mechanism exhibits two important properties. First, agents
have small influence on the outcome of the mechanism and consequently have little influence
on their own utility. As a result all strategies, including truthfulness, are ǫ-dominant. Second,
under the assumption that players are truthful, alternatives which are nearly optimal are most
likely to be chosen. The concrete construction we use follows the Exponential Mechanism
presented by McSherry and Talwar [22].
• With vanishing probability we deploy a mechanism which is designed with the goal of elic-
iting agents’ private information, while ignoring the objective function.
Our technique is developed for settings where the agents’ type spaces as well as the set of social
alternatives are finite. In more concrete settings, however, our techniques extend to ‘large’ type
sets. We demonstrate our results in two specific settings: (1) Facility location problems, where
the social planner is tasked with the optimal location of K facilities in the most efficient way. In
this setting we focus on minimizing the social cost which is the sum of agents’ distances from
the nearest facility. (2) The digital goods pricing model, where a monopolist needs to determine
the price for a digital good (goods with zero marginal cost for production) in order to maximize
revenue.
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Another contribution of our work is an extension of the classical social choice model. In
the classical model agents’ utilities are expressed as a function of the private information and
a social alternative, a modeling that abstracts away the issue of how agents exploit the social
choice made. We explicitly model this by extending the standard model by an additional stage,
following the choice of the social alternative, where agents take an action to exploit the social
alternative and determine their utility (hereinafter ‘reaction’). We motivate this extension to the
standard model with the following examples: (1) In a Facility Location problem agents react to the
mechanism’s outcome by choosing one of the facilities (e.g., choose which school to attend). (2) A
Monopolist posts a price based on agents input. Agents react by either buying the good or not. (3)
In an exchange economy agents react to the price vector (viewed as the outcome of the invisible
hand mechanism) by demanding specific bundles. (4) In a public good problem, where a set of
substitutable goods is supplied, each agent must choose her favorite good. (5) Finally, consider
a network design problem, where each agent must choose the path it will use along the network
created by the society. These examples demonstrate the prevalence of ‘reactions’ in a typical design
problem.1 With this addendum to the model one can enrich the notion of a mechanism; in addition
to determining a social choice the mechanism can also restrict the set of reactions available to an
agent. For example, in the context of school location, the central planner can choose where to build
new schools and, in addition, impose the specific school assigned to each student. We refer to this
aspect of mechanisms as imposition.
We demonstrate the notion of imposition with the following illustrative example:
Example 1 In time of depression the government proposes to subsidize some retraining programs.
There are three possible programs from which the government must choose two due to budget
constraints. Once a pair of programs is chosen each agent is allocated to her favorite program. For
simplicity, assume each candidate for retraining has a strict preference over the three programs,
with utilities equal 1, 2 and 3. Assume the government wants to maximize the social welfare subject
to its budget constraint. A naive approach in which the government chooses the pair that maximizes
the overall grade is clearly manipulable (there may be settings where an agent will falsely down-
grade his 2nd choice to the third place in order to ensure his first choice makes it). An alternative
methodology is for the government to choose a pair randomly, where the probability assigned to
each pair is an increasing function of its induced welfare (the specific nature of the function will be
made clear in the sequel). In addition, with a vanishing probability, a random pair will be chosen
and in that case each agent will assigned her preferred program according to her announcement.
It turns out that this scheme is not manipulable and agents’ optimal strategy is to report truth-
fully. If the population is large enough then the probability of choosing the truly optimal pair can
be made arbitrarily close to one.
1Formally, the introduction of reactions only generalizes the model. In fact, if we assume that the set of reactions
is a singleton then we are back to the classical model. Additionally, it could be argued that reactions can be modeled
as part of the set social alternatives, S. For the analysis and mechanism we propose the distinction between the set S
and the reactions is important.
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1.2 Related Work
Virtual implementation. The most closely related body of work is the literature on ‘virtual im-
plementation’ with incomplete information, derived from earlier work on virtual implementation
with complete information which was initiated by Matsushima [20] and Abreu and Sen [2]. A
social choice function is virtually implementable if for any ǫ > 0 there exists a mechanism which
equilibria result in outcomes that ǫ-approximate the function. Results due to Abreu and Mat-
sushima [1], Duggan [9] and Serrano and Vohra [34, 35] provide necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for functions to be virtually implementable in various environments with private information.
A common thread throughout the results on virtual implementation under incomplete information
is the incentive compatibility requirement over the social choice function, in addition to some
form of type diversity. Compared with our contribution the above mentioned work provides posi-
tive results in environments with small populations, whereas we require large populations in order
to have a meaningful approximation. On the other hand, the solution concepts we focus on are
ex-post Nash equilibrium, undominated strategies, and strict dominance (for the private values set-
ting), compared with iterated deletion of dominated strategies or Bayes-Nash equilibria, provided
in the above mentioned papers. In addition, the virtual implementation results apply to functions
that are incentive compatible from the outset, whereas our technique applies to arbitrary objective
functions. In both cases the mechanisms proposed do not require transfers but do require some
kind of type diversity.
Influence and Approximate Efficiency. The basic driving force underlying our construction
is ensuring that each agent has a vanishing influence on the outcome of the mechanism as the
population grows. In the limit, if players are non-influential, then they might as well be truthful.
This idea is not new and has been used by various authors to provide mechanisms that approximate
efficient outcomes when the population of players is large. Some examples of work that hinge
on a similar principle for large, yet finite populations, are Swinkels [36] who studies auctions,
Satterthwaite and Williams [30] and Rustichini, Satterthwaite and Williams [28] who study double
auctions, and Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky [4] who study an exchange market. The same principle
is even more enhanced in models with a continuum of players, where each agent has no influence
on the joint outcome (e.g., Roberts and Postlewaite [27] who study an exchange economy). The
mechanisms provided in these papers are designed for maximizing the sum of agents’ valuations,
and provide no value for alternative objective functions. In contrast, our results hold a for a wide
range of objective functions and are generic in nature. Interestingly, a similar argument, hinging
on players’ lack of influence, is instrumental to show inefficiency in large population models (for
example, Mailath and Postlewaite [18] demonstrate ‘free-riding’ in the context of public goods,
which eventually leads to inefficiency).
A formal statement of ‘influence’ in an abstract setting appears in Levine and Pesendorfer [17]
and Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky [3]. Beyond the formalization of influence these works provide
bounds on aggregate measures of influence such as the average influence or on the number of
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influential agents. McLean and Postlewaite [21] introduce the notion of informational smallness,
formalizing settings where one player’s information is insignificant with respect to the aggregated
information.
Differential Privacy. The notion of differential privacy, recently introduced by Dwork, McSh-
erry, Nissim and Smith [12], captures a measure of (lack of) privacy by the impact of a single
agent’s input on the outcome of a joint computation. A small impact suggests that the agent’s
privacy cannot be significantly jeopardized. In the limit, if an agent has no impact then nothing
can be learned about the agent from the outcome of the computation. More accurately, differential
privacy stipulates that the influence of any contributor to the computation is bounded in a very
strict sense: any change in the input contributed by an individual translates to at most a near-one
multiplicative factor in the probability distribution over the set of outcomes.2
The scope of computations that were shown to be computed in a differentially private manner
has grown significantly since the introduction of the concept and the reader is referred to Dwork
[11] for a recent survey.
McSherry and Talwar [22] establish an inspiring connection between differential privacy and
mechanism design, where differential privacy is used as a tool for constructing efficient mecha-
nisms. They observe that participants (players) that contribute private information to ǫ-differentially
private computations have limited influence on the outcome of the computation, and hence have
a limited incentive to lie, even if their utility is derived from the joint outcome. Consequently,
truth-telling is approximately dominant in mechanisms that are ǫ-differentially private, regardless
of the agent utility functions.3 McSherry and Talwar introduce the exponential mechanism as a
generic ǫ-differentially private mechanism. In addition, they show that whenever agents are truth-
ful the exponential mechanism chooses a social alternative which almost optimizes the objective
function. They go on and demonstrate the power of this mechanism in the context of Unlimited
Supply Auctions, Attribute Auctions, and Constrained pricing.
The contribution of McSherry and Talwar leaves much to be desired in terms of mechanism de-
sign: (1) It is not clear how to set the value of ǫ. Lower values of ǫ imply higher compatibility with
incentives, on the one hand, but deteriorate the approximation results on the other hand. The model
and results of McSherry and Talwar do not provide a framework for analyzing these countervailing
forces. (2) Truth telling is approximately dominant, but, in fact, in the mechanisms they design
all strategies are approximately dominant, which suggests that truth telling may have no intrin-
sic advantage over any other strategy in their mechanism. (3) Furthermore, one can demonstrate
that misreporting one’s private information can actually dominate other strategies, truth-telling in-
cluded. To make things worse, such dominant strategies may lead to inferior results for the social
planner. This is demonstrated in Example 2, in the context of monopoly pricing.
2The measure of ‘impact’ underlying differential privacy is the analog of ‘influence’ a-la Levine and Pesendor-
fer [17] and Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky [3] in a non-Bayesian framework, with worst-case considerations.
3Schummer [31] also studies approximately dominant strategies, in the context of exchange economies.
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Facility Location. One of the concrete examples we investigate is the optimal location of facil-
ities. The facility location problem has already been tackled in the context of approximate mech-
anism design without money, and turned out to lead to interesting challenges. While the single
facility location problem exhibits preferences that are single-peaked and can be solved optimally
by selecting the median declaration, the 2-facility problem turns out to be non-trivial. Most recently
Wang et al [38] introduce a randomized 4-(multiplicative) approximation truthful mechanism for
the 2 facility location problem. The techniques introduced here provide much better approxima-
tions - in particular we provide an additive O˜(n−1/3) approximation to the average optimal distance
between the agents and the facilities.4
Following our formalization of reactions and of imposition and its applicability to facility lo-
cation, Fotakis and Tzamos [13] provide ‘imposing’ versions of previously known mechanisms to
improve implementation accuracy. They provide constant multiplicative approximation or loga-
rithmic multiplicative approximation, albeit with fully imposing mechanisms.
Non discriminatory Pricing of Digital Goods. Another concrete setting where we demonstrate
our generic results is a pricing application, where a monopolist sets a single price for goods with
zero marginal costs (“digital goods”) in order to maximize revenues. We consider environments
where the potential buyers have interdependent valuations for the good. Pricing mechanisms for
the private values case have been studied by Goldberg et al [15] and Balcan et al [7]. They consider
settings where agents’ valuation are not necessarily restricted to a finite set and achieve O( 1√
n
)-
implementation (where n is the population size). Whereas our mechanism provides a similar bound
it is limited to settings with finitely many possible prices. However, it is derived from general
principles and therefore more robust. In addition, our mechanism is applicable beyond the private
values’ setting.
2 Model
2.1 The Environment
Let N denote a set of n agents, S denotes a finite set of social alternatives and Ti, i = 1, . . . , n,
is a finite type space for agent i. We denote by T = ×ni=1Ti the set of type tuples and write
T−i = ×j 6=iTj with generic element t−i. Agent i’s type, ti ∈ Ti, is her private information. Let
Ri be the set of reactions available to i. Typically, once a social alternative, s ∈ S, is determined
agents choose a reaction ri ∈ Ri. The utility of an agent i is therefore a function of the vector of
4The notation O˜(n−1) is used to denote convergence to zero at a rate ln(n)
n
. Compared with O(n−1) which denotes
convergence to zero at a rate 1
n
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types, the chosen social alternative and the chosen reaction. Formally, ui : T × S × Ri → [0, 1].5
A tuple (T, S, R, u), where R = ×ni=1Ri and u = (u1, . . . , un), is called an environment. We will
use ri(t, s) to denote an arbitrary optimal reaction for agent i (i.e., ri(t, s) is an arbitrary function
which image is in the set argmaxri∈Riui(t, s, ri)).
We say that an agent has private reactions if her optimal reaction of i depends only only on her
type and the social alternative. Formally, agent i has private reactions if argmaxri∈Riui((ti, t−i), s, ri) =
argmaxri∈Riui((ti, t
′
−i), s, ri), for all s, i, ti, t−i and t′−i. To emphasize that ri(t, s) does not depend
on t−i we will use in this case the notation ri(ti, s) to denote an arbitrary optimal reaction for agent
i. We say that an agent has private values if she has private reactions and furthermore her utility
depends only on her type, social alternative and reaction, i.e., ui((ti, t−i), s, ri) = ui((ti, t′−i), s, ri)
for all s, i, ti, t−i and t′−i. In this case we will use the notation ui(ti, s, ri) to denote the agent’s
utility, to emphasize that it does not depend on t−i. In the more general setting, where the utility
ui and the optimal reaction ri may depend on t−i, we say that agents have interdependent values.
An environment is non-trivial if for any pair of types there exists a social alternative for which
the optimal reactions are distinct. Formally, ∀i, ti 6= tˆi ∈ Ti and t−i there exists s ∈ S, denoted
s(ti, tˆi, t−i), such that argmaxri∈Riui((ti, t−i), s, ri) ∩ argmaxri∈Riui((tˆi, t−i), s, ri) = ∅. We say
that s(ti, tˆi, t−i) separates between ti and tˆi at t−i. A set of social alternatives, S˜ ⊂ S is called
separating if for any i and ti 6= tˆi and t−i, there exists some s(ti, tˆi, t−i) ∈ S˜ that separates between
ti and tˆi at t−i.
2.2 The Objective Function
A social planner, not knowing the vector of types, wants to maximize an arbitrary objective function
(sometimes termed social welfare function), F : T ×S → [0, 1].6 We focus our attention on a class
of functions for which individual agents have a diminishing impact, as the population size grows:
Definition 1 (Sensitivity) The objective function F : T×S → [0, 1] is d-sensitive if ∀i, ti 6= tˆi, t−i
and s ∈ S, |F ((ti, t−i), s)− F ((tˆi, t−i), s)| ≤ dn , where n is the population size.7
Note that this definition refers to unilateral changes in announcements, while keeping the social
alternative fixed. In particular d-sensitivity does not exclude the possibility of a radical change in
5Utilities are assumed to be bounded in the unit interval. This is without loss of generality, as long as there is some
uniform bound on the utility.
6In fact, one can consider objective functions of the form F : T ×S×R→ [0, 1]. Our results go through if for any
t and s and any i and r−i the functions F (t, s, (r−i, ·)) : Ri → [0, 1] and ui(t, s, ·) : Ri → [0, 1] are co-monotonic.
In words, as long as the objective function’s outcome (weakly) increases whenever a change in reaction increases an
agent’s utility.
7 In the definition of sensitivity one can replace the constant d with a function d = d(n) that depends on the
population size. Our go through for the more general case as long as limn→∞ d(n)n = 0.
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the optimal social alternative as a result of unilateral deviations, which, in turn, can radically
change the utility of the player. Thus, this definition is mute in the context of the influence of an
agent on her own utility.
One commonly used objective function which is 1-sensitive is the average utility,
F (t, s) =
∑
i ui(t, s, ri(t, s))
n
.
Note that a d-sensitive function eliminates situations where any single agent has an overwhelming
impact on the value of the objective function, for a fixed social alternative s. In fact, if an objective
function is not d-sensitive, for any d, then in a large population this function could be susceptible
to minor faults in the system (e.g., noisy communication channels).8
2.3 Mechanisms
Denote by Ri = 2Ri \ {∅} the set of all subsets of Ri, except for the empty set, and let R = ×iRi.
A (direct) mechanism randomly chooses, for any vector of inputs t a social alternative, and for
each agent i a subset of available reactions. Formally:
Definition 2 (Mechanism) A (direct) mechanism is a function M : T → ∆(S ×R).
In addition, the mechanism discloses the vector of agents’ announcements, and agents can use
this information to choose a reaction.9
We denote by MS(t) the marginal distribution of M(t) on S and by Mi(t) the marginal dis-
tribution on Ri. We say that the mechanism M is non-imposing if Mi(t)(Ri) = 1. That is, the
probability assigned to the grand set of reactions is one, for all i and t ∈ T . Put differently, the
mechanism never restricts the set of available reactions. M is ǫ-imposing if Mi(t)(Ri) ≥ 1− ǫ for
all i and t ∈ T . In words, with probability exceeding 1− ǫ the mechanism imposes no restrictions.
2.4 Strategies and Solution Concepts
A mechanism induces the following game with incomplete information. In the first phase agents
announce their types simultaneously to the mechanism. Then the mechanism chooses a social
8An example of a function that is not d-sensitive, for any d, is the following: set F = 1 (F = 0) if there is an
even number of agents which utility exceeds some threshold and the social alternative is A (B), and F = 0 (F = 1)
otherwise.
9If, however, all agents have private reactions then this information is useless to the agents and we do not require
such a public disclosure of the agents’ announcements.
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alternative and a subset of reactions for each agent. In the second stage of the game each agent,
knowing the strategy tuple of all agents, the vector of announced types, the social alternative and
her available set of reactions, must choose one such reaction. Let Wi : Ti → Ti denote the
announcement of agent i, given his type and let W = (Wi)ni=1. Upon the announcement of the
social alternative s, the vector of opponents’ announcements, t−i and a subset of reactions, Rˆi ⊂
Ri, the rational agent will choose an arbitrary optimal reaction, ri((ti,W−1−i (t−i)), s, Rˆi), where
W−1−i (t−i) denotes the pre-image of W−i at the vector of announcements t−i.10
Thus, given a mechanism and a vector of announcement functions, (Wi)ni=1, the agents’ reac-
tion are uniquely defined. Therefore, we can view (Wi)ni=1 as the agents’ strategies, without an
explicit reference to the choice of reactions. Given a vector of types, t, and a strategy tuple W , the
mechanism M induces a probability distribution, M(W (t)) over the set of social alternatives and
reaction tuples. The expected utility of i, at a vector of types t, is EM(W (t))ui(t, s, ri), where ri is
short-writing for the optimal reaction, which itself is determined by M and W . In fact, hereinafter
we suppress the reference to the reactions in our notations and write EM(W (t))ui(t, s) instead of
EM(W (t))ui(t, s, ri).
A strategyWi is dominant for the mechanismM if for any vector of types t ∈ T , any alternative
strategy Wˆi of i and any strategy profile W¯−i of i’s opponents
EM((Wi(ti),W¯−i(t−i)))ui(t, s) ≥ EM((Wˆi(ti),W¯−i(t−i)))ui(t, s). (1)
In words, Wi is a strategy that maximizes the expected payoff of i for any vector of types and
any strategy used by her opponents. If for all i the strategy Wi(ti) = ti is dominant then M is
called truthful (or strategyproof).11
A strategy Wi is strictly dominant if it is dominant and furthermore whenever W (ti) 6= Wˆ (ti)
then a strong inequality holds in Equation (1). If Wi(ti) = ti is strictly dominant for all i then M
is strictly truthful.
A strategyWi is dominated for the mechanismM if there exists an alternative strategy Wˆi, such
that for any vector of types t ∈ T , and any strategy profile W¯−i of i’s opponents, the following
holds: EM((Wi(ti),W¯−i(t−i)))ui(t, s) ≤ EM((Wˆi(ti),W¯−i(t−i)))ui(t, s), with a strong inequality holding
for at least one type vector t.
Finally, a strategy tuple W is an ex-post Nash Equilibrium if for all i and t ∈ T and for any
strategy Wˆi of player i, EM(W (t))ui(t, s) ≥ EM((Wˆi(ti),W−i(t−i)))ui(t, s). If {Wi(ti) = ti}ni=1 is an
ex-post Nash equilibrium then M is ex-post Nash truthful.
10We slightly abuse notation as W−1−i (t−i) may not be a singleton but a subset of type vectors, in which case the
optimal reaction is not well defined. More accurate notation must involve considering another primitive to the model
- the prior belief of i over T−i. With such a prior ri((ti,W−1−i (t−i)), s, Ri) denotes the reaction in Rˆi that maximizes
the expected utility with respect to the prior belief, conditional on the subset W−1−i (t−i).
11Note we do not require a strong inequality to hold on any instance.
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2.5 Implementation
Given a vector of types, t, the expected value of the objective function, F , at the strategy tuple W
is EM(W (t))[F (t, s)].
Definition 3 (β-implementation) We say that the mechanism M β-implements F in (strictly)
dominant strategies, for β > 0, if for any (strictly) dominant strategy tuple, W , for any t ∈ T ,
EM(W (t))[F (t, s)] ≥ maxs∈SF (t, s)− β.
A mechanism M β-implements F in an ex-post Nash equilibrium if for some ex-post Nash
equilibrium strategy tuple, W , for any t ∈ T , EM(W (t))[F (t, s)] ≥ maxs∈SF (t, s)− β.
A mechanism M β-implements F in undominated strategies if for any tuple of strategies, W ,
that are not dominated and for any t ∈ T , EM(W (t))[F (t, s)] ≥ maxs∈SF (t, s)− β.
Main Theorem (informal statement): For any d-sensitive function F and 1 > β > 0 there
exists a number n0 and a mechanism M which β-implements F in an ex-post Nash equilibrium,
whenever the population has more than n0 agents. If, in addition, reactions are private then M
β-implements F in strictly dominant strategies.
3 A Framework of Approximate Implementation
In this section we present a general scheme for implementing arbitrary objective functions in large
societies. The convergence rate we demonstrate is of an order of magnitude of
√
ln(n)
n
. Our scheme
involves a lottery between two mechanisms: (1) The Exponential Mechanism, a non-imposing
differentially-private mechanism that randomly selects a social alternative, s. The probability of
choosing s is proportional to (a exponent of) the value it induces on F ; and (2) The Commitment
Mechanism, where imposition is used to commit agents to take a reaction that complies with their
announced type.
3.1 The Exponential Mechanism and Differential Privacy
Consider the following non-imposing mechanism, which we refer to as the Exponential Mecha-
nism, originally introduced by McSherry and Talwar [22]:
M ǫ(t)(s) =
enǫF (t,s)∑
s¯∈S e
nǫF (t,s¯)
.
10
The Exponential mechanism has two notable properties, as we show below: It provides ǫ-
differential privacy, i.e., for all i it is insensitive to a change in ti. And, it chooses s that almost
maximizes F (t, s).
We follow Dwork et al [12] and define:
Definition 4 [ǫ-differential privacy] A mechanism, M , provides ǫ-differential privacy if it is non-
imposing and for any s ∈ S, any pair of type vectors t, tˆ ∈ T , which differ only on a single
coordinate, M(t)(s) ≤ eǫ ·M(tˆ)(s).12
In words, a mechanism preserves ǫ-differential privacy if, for any vector of announcements, a uni-
lateral deviation changes the probabilities assigned to any social choice s ∈ S by a (multiplicative)
factor of eǫ, which approaches 1 as ǫ approaches zero.13
Lemma 1 (McSherry and Talwar [22]) If F is d-sensitive then M ǫ2d (t) preserves ǫ-differential
privacy.
The proof is simple, and is provided for completeness:
Proof: Let t and tˆ be or two type vectors that differ on a single coordinate. Then for any s ∈ S,
F (t, s)− d
n
≤ F (tˆ, s) ≤ F (t, s) + d
n
, hence,
M
ǫ
2d (t)(s)
M
ǫ
2d (tˆ)(s)
=
e
nǫF (t,s)
2d
∑
s¯∈S e
nǫF (t,s¯)
2d
e
nǫF (tˆ,s)
2d
∑
s¯∈S e
nǫF (tˆ,s¯)
2d
≤
e
nǫF (t,s)
2d
∑
s¯∈S e
nǫF (t,s¯)
2d
e
nǫ(F (t,s)− dn )
2d
∑
s¯∈S e
nǫ(F (t,s¯)+ dn )
2d
= eǫ.
QED
The appeal of mechanisms that provide ǫ-differential privacy is that they induce near indiffer-
ence among all strategies, in the following sense:
Lemma 2 If M is non-imposing and provides ǫ-differential privacy, for some ǫ < 1, then for any
agent i, any type tuple t, any strategy tuple W , and any alternative strategy for i, Wˆi the following
holds:
|EM(W (t))[ui(t, s)]− EM(Wˆi(ti),W−i(t−i))[ui(t, s)]| < 2ǫ.
12For non discrete sets of alternatives the definition requires that M(t)(Sˆ)
M(tˆ)(Sˆ)
≤ eǫ ∀Sˆ ⊂ S.
13The motivation underlying this definition of ǫ-differential privacy is that if a single agent’s input to a database
changes then a query on that database would result in (distributionally) similar results. This, in return, suggests that it
is difficult to learn new information about the agent from the query, thus preserving her privacy.
11
The proof is simple, and is provided for completeness:
Proof: Let W and Wˆ be two strategy vectors that differ the i’th coordinate. Then for every
t ∈ T , s ∈ S, ri ∈ Ri and ui : T × S × Ri → [0, 1] we have
EM(W (t))[ui(t, s)] =
∑
s∈S
M(W (t))(s) · ui(t, s)
≤
∑
s∈S
eǫ ·M(Wˆi(ti),W−i(t−i))(s) · ui(t, s)
= eǫ ·EWˆi(ti),W−i(t−i))[ui(t, s)],
where the inequality follows since M provides ǫ-differential privacy, and ui is non-negative. A
similar analysis gives
EWˆi(ti),W−i(t−i))[ui(t, s)] ≤ eǫ · EM(W (t))[ui(t, s)].
Hence we get:
EM(W (t))[ui(t, s)]−EM(Wˆi(ti),W−i(t−i))[ui(t, s)] ≤ (eǫ − 1) · EM(Wˆi(ti),W−i(t−i))[ui(t, s)]
≤ eǫ − 1,
where the last inequality holds because ui returns a values in [0, 1]. Similarly,
EM(Wˆi(ti),W−i(t−i))[ui(t, s)]− EM(W (t))[ui(t, s)] ≤ eǫ − 1.
To conclude the lemma, note that (eǫ − 1) ≤ 2ǫ for 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1.
QED
McSherry and Talwar [22] note in particular that in the case of private values truthfulness is
2ǫ-dominant, which is an immediate corollary of Lemma 2. They combine this with the following
observation to conclude that exponential mechanisms approximately implement F in ǫ- dominant
strategies:
Lemma 3 (McSherry and Talwar [22]) Let F : T n × S → [0, 1] be an arbitrary d-sensitive
objective function and n > e2d
ǫ|S| . Then for any t, EM ǫ2d (t)[F (t, s)] ≥ maxs F (t, s)− 4dnǫ ln
(
nǫ|S|
2d
)
.
Proof: Let δ = 2d
nǫ
ln
(
nǫ|S|
2d
)
. As n > e2d
ǫ|S| we conclude that ln
(
nǫ|S|
2d
)
> ln e > 0 and, in
particular, δ > 0.
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Fix a vector of types, t and denote by Sˆ = {sˆ ∈ S : F (t, sˆ) < maxs F (t, s) − δ}. For any
sˆ ∈ Sˆ the following holds:
M
ǫ
2d (t)(sˆ) =
e
nǫF (t,sˆ)
2d∑
s′∈S e
nǫF (t,s′)
2d
≤ e
nǫ(maxs F (t,s)−δ)
2d
e
nǫmaxs F (t,s)
2d
= e−
nǫ
2d
δ.
Therefore, M ǫ2d (t)(Sˆ) =
∑
sˆ∈SˆM
ǫ
2d (t)(sˆ) ≤ |Sˆ|e−nǫ2d δ ≤ |S|e−nǫ2d δ. Which, in turn, implies:
E
M
ǫ
2d (t)
[F (t, s)] ≥ (max
s
F (t, s)− δ)(1− |S|e−nǫ2d δ) ≥ max
s
F (t, s)− δ − |S|e−nǫ2d δ.
Substituting for δ we get that
E
M
ǫ
2d (t)
[F (t, s)] ≥ max
s
F (t, s)− 2d
nǫ
ln
(
nǫ|S|
2d
)
− 2d
nǫ
.
In addition, n > e2d
ǫ|S| which implies ln
(
nǫ|S|
2d
)
> ln(e) = 1, and hence 2d
nǫ
≤ 2d
nǫ
ln
(
nǫ|S|
2d
)
.
Plugging this into the previous inequality yields E
M
ǫ
2d (t)
[F (t, s)] ≥ maxs F (t, s) − 4dnǫ ln
(
nǫ|S|
2d
)
as desired.
QED
Note that limn→∞ 4dnǫ ln
(
nǫ|S|
2d
)
= 0 whenever the parameters d, ǫ and |S| are held fixed.14
Therefore, the exponential mechanism is almost optimal for a large and truthful population.
Remark: There are other mechanisms which exhibit similar properties to those of the Expo-
nential Mechanism, namely ‘almost indifference’ and ‘approximate optimality’. The literature on
differential privacy is rich in techniques for establishing mechanisms with such properties. Some
techniques for converting computations into ǫ-differentially private computations without jeopar-
dizing the accuracy too much are the addition of noise calibrated to global sensitivity by Dwork et
al. [12], the addition of noise calibrated to smooth sensitivity and the sample and aggregate frame-
work by Nissim et al. [24]. The reader is further referred to the recent survey of Dwork [11]. Any
of these mechanisms can replace the exponential mechanism in the following analysis.
14This limit also approaches zero if d, ǫ, |S| depend on n, as long as d/ǫ is sublinear in n and |S| is subexponential
in n.
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3.2 The Commitment Mechanism
We now consider an imposing mechanism that chooses s ∈ S randomly, while ignoring agents’
announcements. Once s is chosen the mechanism restricts the allowable reactions for i to those that
are optimal assuming all agents are truthful. Formally, if s is chosen according to the probability
distribution P , let MP denote the following mechanism:
MPS (t)(s) = P (s) and MPi (t)(ri(t, s))|s) = 1.
Players do not influence the choice of s in MP and so they are (weakly) better off being truthful.
We define the gap of the environment, γ = g(T, S, A, u), as:
γ = g(T, S, A, u) = min
i,ti 6=bi,t−i
max
s∈S
(ui(t, s, ri(t, s))− ui(t, s, ri((bi, t−i), s))) .
In words, γ is a lower bound for the loss incurred by misreporting in case of an adversarial
choice of s ∈ S. In non-trivial environments γ > 0. We say the a distribution P is separating if
there exists a separating set S˜ ⊂ S such that P (s˜) > 0 for all s˜ ∈ S˜. In this case we also say that
MP is a separating mechanism. In particular let p˜ = mins∈S˜ P (s). Clearly one can choose P such
that p˜ ≥ 1|S| . The following is straightforward:
Lemma 4 If the environment (T, S, A, u) is non-trivial and P is a separating distribution over S
then ∀bi 6= ti, t−i,
EMP (ti,t−i)[ui(t, s, ri(t, s))] ≥ EMP (bi,t−i)[ui(t, s, ri((bi, t−i), s))] + p˜γ .
If, in addition, reactions are private, then for any i, bi 6= ti, t−i and b−i:
EMP (ti,b−i)[ui(t, s, ri(ti, s))] ≥ EMP (bi,b−i)[ui(t, s, ri(bi, s))] + p˜γ.
Proof: For any pair bi 6= ti and for any s ∈ S ui(t, s, ri(ti, s)) ≥ ui(t, s, ri(bi, s)). In
addition, there exists some sˆ = s(ti, bi), satisfying P (sˆ) ≥ p˜, for which ui(t, sˆ, ri(ti, sˆ)) ≥
ui(t, sˆ, ri(bi, sˆ))+γ. Therefore, for any i, bi 6= ti ∈ Ti and for any t−i,EMP (ti,t−i)[ui(t, s, ri(t, s))] ≥
EMP (bi,t−i)[ui(t, s, ri((bi, t−i), s))] + p˜γ , as claimed.
Recall that if reactions are private then ri(t, s) = ri(ti, s), namely the optimal reaction of an
agent, given some social alternative s, depends only on the agent’s type. Therefore we derive the
result for private reactions by replacing ri((ti, t−i), s) with ri(ti, s) on the left hand side of the last
inequality and ri((bi, t−i), s) with ri(bi, s) on the right hand side.
QED
The following is an immediate corollary:
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Corollary 1 If the environment (T, S, A, u) is non-trivial and P is a separating distribution over
S then
1. Truthfulness is an ex-post Nash equilibrium of MP .
2. If agent i has private reactions then truthfulness is a strictly dominant strategy for i in MP .
An alternative natural imposing mechanism is that of a random dictator, where a random agent
is chosen to dictate the social outcome. Similarly, agents will be truthful in such a mechanism.
However, the loss from misreporting can only be bounded below by γ
n
, whereas the commitment
mechanism gives a lower bound of γp˜ ≥ γ|S| , which is independent of the population size.
3.3 A Generic and Nearly Optimal Mechanism
Fix a non-trivial environment (T, S, A, u) with a gap γ, separating set S˜, a d-sensitive objective
function F and a separating commitment mechanism, MP , with p˜ = mins∈S˜ P (s).
Set M¯ ǫq (t) = (1− q)M
ǫ
2d (t) + qMP (t).
Theorem 1 If qp˜γ ≥ 2ǫ then the mechanism M¯ ǫq is ex-post Nash truthful. Furthermore, if agents
have private reactions then M¯ ǫq is strictly truthful.
Proof: Follows immediately from Lemmas 2 (set W (ti) = ti ) and 4.
QED
Set the parameters of the mechanism M¯ ǫq (t) as follows:
• ǫ =
√
p˜γd
n
√
ln
(
np˜γ|S|
2d
)
.
• q = 2ǫ
p˜γ
.
and consider populations of size n > n0, where n0 is the minimal integer satisfying n0 ≥
max{ 8d
p˜γ
ln
(
p˜γ|S|
2d
)
, 4e
2d
p˜γ|S|} and n0ln(n0) > 8dp˜γ .
Lemma 5 If n > n0 then
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1. q = 2ǫ
p˜γ
< 1.
2. ǫ < p˜γ.
3. n > 2ed
ǫ|S| .
Proof: Part (1): n
ln(n)
> n0
ln(n0)
≥ 8d
p˜γ
which implies n > 8d
p˜γ
ln(n). In addition, n > n0 >
8d
p˜γ
ln
(
p˜γ|S|
2d
)
. Therefore n > 4d
p˜γ
ln
(
p˜γ|S|
2d
)
+ 4d
p˜γ
ln(n) = 4d
p˜γ
ln
(
p˜γ|S|n
2d
)
=⇒ (p˜γ)2 > 4p˜γd
n
ln
(
p˜γ|S|n
2d
)
.
Taking the square root and substituting for ǫ on the right hand side yields p˜γ > 2ǫ and the claim
follows.
Part (2) follows directly from part (1)
Part (3): n > n0 ≥ 4e2dp˜γ|S| ≥ 4e
2d
p˜γ|S|2 =⇒
√
n > 2ed√
p˜γd|S| . In addition n >
4e2d
p˜γ|S| >
2de
p˜γ|S| which
implies 1 < ln
(
p˜γ|S|n
2d
)
. Combining these two inequalities we get:
√
n > 2ed√
p˜γd
√
ln( p˜γ|S|n2d )|S|
.
Multiplying both sides by
√
n implies n > 2ed
√
n
√
p˜γd
√
ln( p˜γ|S|n2d )|S|
= 2ed
ǫ|S| .
QED
Using these parameters we set Mˆ(t) = M¯ ǫq (t). Our main result is:
Theorem 2 (Main Theorem) The mechanism Mˆ(t) is ex-post Nash truthful and, in addition,
it 6
√
d
p˜γn
√
ln
(
np˜γ|S|
2d
)
-implements F in ex-post Nash equilibrium, for n > n0. If agents have
private reactions the mechanism is strictly truthful and 6
√
d
p˜γn
√
ln
(
np˜γ|S|
2d
)
-implements F in
strictly dominant strategies.
Recall that for ex-post Nash implementation we only need to show that one ex-post Nash
equilibrium yields the desired outcome.
Proof: Given the choice of parameters ǫ and q then, Theorem 1 guarantees that Mˆ(t) is ex-post
Nash truthful (and truthful whenever reactions are private). Therefore, it is sufficient to show that
for any type vector t,
EMˆ(t)(F (t, s)) ≥ maxs F (t, s)− 6
√
d
p˜γn
√
ln
(
np˜γ|S|
2d
)
.
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Note that as F is positive, EMP (t)[F (t, s)] ≥ 0 and so
EMˆ(t)[F (t, s)] ≥ (1− q)EM ǫ2d (t)[F (t, s)].
By part (3) of Lemma 5 we are guaranteed that the condition on the size of of the population of
Lemma 3 holds and so we can apply Lemma 3 to conclude that:
EMˆ(t)[F (t, s)] ≥ (1− q)
(
max
s
F (t, s)− 4d
nǫ
ln
(
nǫ|S|
2d
))
.
We substitute q with 2ǫ
p˜γ
and recall that maxs F (t, s) ≤ 1. In addition, part (1) of Lemma 5
asserts that 2ǫ
p˜γ
< 1. Therefore
EMˆ(t)[F (t, s)] ≥ maxs F (t, s)−
2ǫ
p˜γ
− 4d
nǫ
ln
(
nǫ|S|
2d
)
≥ max
s
F (t, s)− 2ǫ
p˜γ
− 4d
nǫ
ln
(
np˜γ|S|
2d
)
,
where the last inequality is based on the fact ǫ < p˜γ, which is guaranteed by part (2) of Lemma 5.
Substituting ǫ for
√
p˜γd
n
√
ln
(
np˜γ|S|
2d
)
we conclude that
EMˆ(t)[F (t, s)] ≥ maxs F (t, s)− 2
√
d
p˜γn
√
ln
(
np˜γ|S|
2d
)
− 4
√
d
p˜γn
√
ln
(
np˜γ|S|
2d
)
and the result follows.
QED
One particular case of interest is the commitment mechanism MU , where U is the uniform
distribution over the set S:
Corollary 2 Let n0 be the minimal integer satisfying n0 ≥ max{8d˜|S|γ ln
(
γ
2d
)
, 4e
2d
γ|S| } and n0ln(n0) >
8d|S|
γ
. Then the mechanism MˆU (t) 6
√
d|S|
γn
√
ln
(
nγ
2d
)
-implements F , in ex-post Nash equilib-
rium, for all n > n0. If agents have private reactions the mechanism MˆU (t) 6
√
d|S|
γn
√
ln
(
nγ
2d
)
-
implements F in strictly dominant strategies.
Proof: P = U implies that the minimal probability is p˜ = 1|S| . Plugging this into Theorem 2
gives the result.
QED
Holding the parameters of the environment d, γ, |S| fixed the approximation inaccuracy of our
mechanism converges to zero at a rate of
√
ln(n)
n
.
In summary, by concatenating the exponential mechanism, where truthfulness is ǫ-dominant
with the commitment mechanism we obtain a strictly truthful mechanism. In fact, this would hold
true for any mechanism where truthfulness is ǫ-dominant not only the exponential mechanism.
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4 Applications
We now turn to demonstrate the generic results in two concrete applications.
4.1 Monopolist Pricing
A monopolist producing digital goods, for which the marginal cost of production is zero, faces a
set of indistinguishable buyers. Each buyer has a unit demand with a valuation in the unit inter-
val. Agents are arranged in (mutually exclusive) cohorts and the valuations of cohort members
are correlated. Each agent receives a private signal and her valuation is uniquely determined by
the signals of all her cohort members. The monopolist wants to set a uniform price in order to
maximize her average revenue per user.15
Assume there are N · D agents, with agents labeled (n, d) (the dth agent in the nth cohort).
Agent (n, d) receives a signal Xnd ∈ IR and we denote a cohort’s vector of signals by Xn =
{Xnd }Dd=1. We assume that the valuation of an agent, V nd , is uniquely determined by the signals of
her cohort members; V nd = V nd (Xn).
We assume that each agent’s signal is informative in the sense that V nd (Xn) > V nd (Xˆn) when-
ever Xn > Xˆn (in each coordinate a weak inequality holds and for at least one of the coordinates
a strong inequality holds). That is, whenever an individual’s signal increases the valuation of each
of her cohort members increases.
Let R(n,d) = {‘Buy’, ‘Not buy’} be the set of reactions for agent (n, d).
The utility of (n, d), given the vector of signalsX = {Xn}Nn=1 = {{Xnd }Dd=1}Nn=1, and the price
p, is
u(n,d)(X, p, r(n,d)) =
{
V nd (X
n)− p if r(n,d) = ‘Buy’,
0 if r(n,d) = ‘Not buy’.
We assume that all valuations are restricted to the unit interval, prices are restricted to some
finite grid S = Sm = {0, 1m , 2m , . . . , 1} (hence, |S| = m + 1), and Xnd takes on only finitely many
values. We assume the price grid is fine enough so that for any two vectors Xn > Xˆn there exists
some price p ∈ S such that E(V n|Xn) > p + 2
m
> p > E(V n|Xˆn). Therefore for vector of
announcements there exists a maximal price for which optimal reaction is Buy. For that price, if
an agent announces a lower value then the best reaction would be Not Buy, which will yield a loss
of 1
m
at least. Similarly, there exists the lowest price for which the optimal reaction is Not Buy.
15To make this more concrete one can think of the challenge of pricing a fire insurance policy to apartment owners.
Each apartment building is a cohort that shares the same risk and once the risk is determined (via aggregation of
agents’ signals) each agent has a private valuation for the insurance.
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Announcing a higher value will result in the optimal reaction being Buy, which yields a loss of 1
m
at least. We conclude that the gap is γ = 1
m
.
The monopolist wants to maximize F (t, p) = p
ND
· |{(n, d) : V nd (Xn) > p}|, the average
revenue per buyer. Note that a unilateral change in the type of one agent may change at most the
buying behavior of the D members in her cohort, resulting in a change of at most pD
ND
≤ D
ND
in the
average revenue. As the population size is ND we conclude that F is D-sensitive.
Let Mdg be a mechanism as in Corollary 2, where a Uniform Commitment mechanism is used:
Corollary 3 For any D there exists some N0 such that for all N > N0 the mechanism Mdg
O(
√
m2
N
ln(N
m
))-implements F in ex-post Nash equilibrium.
The literature on optimal pricing in this setting has so far concentrated on the private values
case and has provided better approximations. For example, Balcan et al. [7], using sampling
techniques from Machine Learning, provide a mechanism that O( 1√
n
)-implements the maximal
revenue without any restrictions to a grid.
A Multi Parameter Extension: In the above setting we assumed a simple single-parameter type
space. However, the technique provided does not hinge on this. In particular, it extends to more
complex settings where agents have a multi-parameter type space. More concretely, consider a
monopolist that produces G types of digital goods, each with zero marginal cost for production.
There are N buyers, where each buyer assigns a value, in some bounded interval, to each subset
of the G goods (agents want at most a singe unit of each good). The monopolist sets G prices,
one for each good, and once prices are set each agent chooses his optimal bundle. The challenge
of the monopolist is to maximize the average revenue per buyer. In this model types are suffi-
ciently diverse. In fact, for any two types there exists a price vector that yields different optimal
consumptions. Therefore, the scheme we provide applies just as well to this setting.
4.2 Facility Location
Consider a population of n agents located on the unit interval. An agent’s location is private
information and a social planner needs to locate K similar facilities in order to minimize the
average distance agents travel to the nearest facility.16 We assume each agent wants to minimize
her distance to the facility that services her. In particular, this entails that values (and reactions) are
private. We furthermore assume that agent and facility locations are all restricted to a fixed finite
16For expositional reasons we restricting attention to the unit interval and to the average travel distance. Similar
results can be obtained for other sets in IR2 and other metrics, such as distance squared.
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grid on the unit interval, L = L(m) = {0, 1
m
, 2
m
, . . . , 1}. Using the notation of previous sections,
let Ti = L, S = LK , and let Ri = L. The utility of agent i is
ui(ti, s, ri) =
{ −|ti − ri| if ri ∈ s,
−1 otherwise.
Hence, ri(bi, s) is the facility closest to the locations of the facility in s closest to bi. Let F (t, s) =
1
n
∑n
i=1 ui(ti, s, ri(ti, s)) be the social utility function, which is 1-sensitive (i.e., d = 1).
First, consider the uniform commitment mechanism MˆU , which is based on the uniform dis-
tribution over S for the commitment mechanism. Now consider the mechanism MˆLOC1, based on
the uniform commitment mechanism, as in Corollary 2
Corollary 4 ∃n0 such that ∀n > n0 the mechanism MˆLOC1 6
√
m(m+1)K
n
√
ln
(
n
2m
)
- implements
the optimal location in strictly dominant strategies.
Proof: Note that γ = 1
m
, |S| = (m+ 1)K and the proof follows immediately from Theorem 2.
QED
Now consider an alternative commitment mechanism. Consider the distribution P , over S =
LK , which chooses uniformly among all the following alternatives - placing one facility in location
j
m
and the remaining K − 1 facilities in location j+1
m
, where j = 0, . . . , m− 1. Note that for any i,
any pair bi 6= ti is separated by at least one alternative in this set. For this mechanism p˜ = 1m . Now
consider the mechanism MˆLOC2, based on the commitment mechanism, MP :
Corollary 5 ∃n0 such that ∀n > n0 MˆLOC2 6m√n
√
ln
(
n(m+1)K
2m2
)
-implements the optimal location
in strictly dominant strategies.
Proof: In analogy to the proof of Theorem 2, setting ǫ = 1
m
√
n
√
ln
(
n(m+1)K
2m2
)
and q = 2ǫm2.
QED
For both mechanisms the approximation error converges to zero at a rate proportional to 1/
√
n
as society grows. In addition, the approximation error of both mechanisms grows as the grid size,
m, grows. However in the second mechanism approximation deteriorates at a substantially slower
rate.
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5 Large Type Sets
The arguments underlying the generic approximate optimal mechanism for a finite number of
social alternatives do not generally extend to models where the type set is large. However, in
concrete models, where additional structure is assumed, such an extension may be possible. We
demonstrate this in the facility location problem introduced in the previous section.
As before, we assume that each player is located on the unit interval and that her location
is private information. Formally, set T = [0, 1]. A mechanism must (randomly) decide on the
location of K facilities in the unit interval. Let S = [0, 1]K and consider the standard Borel σ-
algebra which we denote S. The objective of the designer is to minimize the average distance a
player must travel to a facility. Formally, the designer seeks to minimize F (t, s) = 1
n
∑n
i=1 |ti −
ri(ti, s)|, where ri(ti, s) denotes the facility in s that is closest to ti.
We use a continuous version of the Exponential Mechanism, where the probability of any event
Sˆ ∈ S is given by:
M ǫ(t)(Sˆ) =
∫
Sˆ
enǫF (t,s)ds∫
S
enǫF (t,s)ds
∀Sˆ ∈ S.
We say that a mechanism M provides ǫ-differential privacy if M(t)(Sˆ)
M(tˆ)(Sˆ)
≤ eǫ ∀Sˆ ∈ S and for any
pair of type tuples, t and tˆ, that differ on a single entry. McSherry and Talwar [22] prove the
following (which is analogous to lemma 1):
Lemma 6 (McSherry and Talwar [22]) If F is d-sensitive then M ǫ2d (t) preserves ǫ-differential
privacy.
The proof is identical to that of Lemma 1 and is therefore omitted.
5.1 The approximation accuracy of the Exponential Mechanism
The solution concept we pursue in this section is deletion of dominated strategies. In fact, what we
show in the sequel is that being truthful dominates significantly mis-reporting one’s type. Thus,
deletion of dominated strategies implies that agents resort to strategies that are ‘almost’ truthful.
Consequently, we turn to study the approximation accuracy of the Exponential Mechanism
whenever agents slightly mis-report their types. We begin by considering truthful agents.
To state the next lemma we introduce the following notation. For 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 let Sα = Sα(t) =
{s¯ ∈ S : F (t, s¯) ≥ maxs F (t, s) − α}, and S¯α = S¯α(t) = S \ Sα. Let µ denote the uniform
probability over S.
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Lemma 7 (McSherry and Talwar [22]) If α ≥ 2d
nǫ
ln
(
maxs F (t,s)
αµ(Sα)
)
thenE
M
ǫ
2d (t)
[F (t, s)] ≥maxs F (t, s)−
3α.
We include the proof for completeness.
Proof: Note first that
M
ǫ
2d (t)(S¯2α) ≤ M
ǫ
2d (t)(S¯2α)
M
ǫ
2d (t)(Sα)
=
∫
S¯2α
e
nǫF (t,s¯)
2d ds¯∫
Sα
e
nǫF (t,s¯)
2d ds¯
≤
∫
S¯2α
e
nǫ(maxs F (t,s)−2α)
2d ds¯∫
Sα
e
nǫ(maxs F (t,s)−α)
2d ds¯
= e
−nǫα
2d · µ(S¯2α)
µ(Sα)
≤ e
−nǫα
2d
µ(Sα)
,
where the first inequality follows from M ǫ2d (t)(Sα) ≤ 1, the second inequality follows from the
definition of S¯2α and Sα, and the third inequality follows from µ(S¯2α) ≤ 1. Hence, we get that
M
ǫ
2d (t) returns s ∈ S2α with probability at least 1− e
−nǫα
2d
µ(Sα)
≥ 1− α
maxs F (t,s)
. Hence,
E
M
ǫ
2d (t)
[F (t, s)] ≥ (max
s
F (t, s)− 2α)(1− α
maxs F (t, s)
) ≥ max
s
F (t, s)− 3α.
QED
This result enables us to prove the following:
Corollary 6 E
M
ǫ
2 (t)
[F (t, s)] ≥ maxs F (t, s)− 6nǫ ln
(
e+ (nǫ)K+1
)
.
Proof: Fix a tuple of players’ locations t ∈ T n and let s denote the alternative in S that
minimizes F (t, s). For any α > 0, if sˆ ∈ [0, 1]K satisfies maxk |sˆk − sk| < α then sˆ ∈ Sα. To see
this note that
F (t, s′) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
ui(ti, s
′, ri(ti, s′))
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
ui(ti, s
′, ri(ti, s))
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
(ui(ti, s, ri(ti, s)) + α)
≤ F (t, s′) + α.
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Therefore, whenever α ≤ 0.5, µ(Sα) ≥ αK .
Set α = 2
nǫ
ln
(
e + (nǫ)K+1
)
. We argue that α ≥ 2
nǫ
ln
(
maxs F (t,s)
αµ(Sα)
)
which implies that we
can apply Lemma 7. To see this recall that maxs F (t, s) ≤ 1, and using our bound on µ(Sα) it
suffices to show that (nǫ)K+1 ≥ 1/αK+1, which indeed is the case as α ≥ 1/nǫ. By Lemma 7
E
M
ǫ
2 (t)
[F (t, s)] ≥ maxs F (t, s)− 6nǫ ln
(
e + (nǫ)K+1
)
, as required.
QED
We now turn to analyze the case where agents misreport their location.
Lemma 8
• |F (bi, t−i, s)− F (ti, t−i, s)| ≤ 1n |ti − bi|; and
• |F (b, s)− F (t, s)| ≤ maxi|ti − bi|.
Proof: To derive the first part note that
−ui(bi, s, ri(bi, s)) = |bi − ri(bi, s)| ≤ |bi − ri(ti, s)| = |bi − ti + ti − ri(ti, s)|
≤ |bi − ti|+ |ti − ri(ti, s)| = |bi − ti| − ui(ti, s, ri(ti, s)),
and (by a similar analysis)−ui(ti, s, ri(ti, s)) ≤ |bi−ti|−ui(bi, s, ri(bi, s)). Hence, |ui(bi, s, ri(bi, s))−
ui(ti, s, ri(ti, s))| ≤ |bi − ti| and we get that
|F (bi, t−i, s)− F (ti, t−i, s)| = 1
n
|ui(bi, s, ri(bi, s))− ui(ti, s, ri(ti, s))| ≤ 1
n
|ti − bi|.
The second part follows by iteratively applying the first part for n times.
QED
Lemma 9 If |bi − ti| ≤ β for all i then |maxs F (t, s)−maxs F (b, s)| ≤ β.
Proof: Let st ∈ argmaxs{F (t, s)} and sb ∈ argmaxs{F (b, s)}. Using triangle inequality,
|ti − bi| + |bi − ri(bi, sb)| ≥ |ti − ri(bi, sb)|, and noting that |ti − ri(bi, sb)| ≥ |ti − ri(ti, sb)| we
get that
|ti − bi|+ |bi − ri(bi, sb)| ≥ |ti − ri(ti, sb)|.
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Hence,
1
n
n∑
i=1
− (|ti − bi|+ |bi − ri(bi, sb)|) ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
−|ti − ri(ti, sb)| = F (t, sb) ≤ F (t, st).
Noting that 1
n
∑n
i=1−|bi − ri(bi, sb)| = F (b, sb) we get that
F (b, sb)− F (t, st) ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
|ti − bi| ≤ β. (2)
A similar argument yields
F (t, st)− F (b, sb) ≤ β. (3)
Combining inequalities 2 and 3 we conclude that
|max
s
F (t, s)−max
s
F (b, s)| = |F (t, st)− F (b, sb)| ≤ β,
as claimed.
QED
Lemma 10 If |bi−ti| ≤ β for all i thenEM ǫ2 (b)[F (t, s)] ≥ maxs F (t, s)−2β− 6nǫ ln
(
e + (nǫ)K+1
)
Proof: For any finite set of locations s ⊂ [0, 1], traveling from ti to the point closest to ti in s
is not longer than a taking a detour via bi, and then traveling from bi to the point closest to bi in s,
i.e., |ti − ri(ti, s)| ≤ |ti − bi|+ |bi − ri(bi, s)|. Therefore,
E
M
ǫ
2 (b)
[F (t, s)] ≥ E
M
ǫ
2 (b)
[F (b, s)]− 1
n
n∑
i=1
|ti − bi| ≥ EM ǫ2 (b)[F (b, s)]− β.
By Corollary 6,
E
M
ǫ
2 (b)
[F (b, s)] ≥ max
s
F (b, s)− 6
nǫ
ln
(
e+ (nǫ)K+1
)
.
By Lemma 9,
max
s
F (b, s) ≥ max
s
F (t, s)− β.
Combining all three inequalities above gives:
E
M
ǫ
2 (b)
[F (t, s)] ≥ max
s
F (t, s)− 2β − 6
nǫ
ln
(
e + (nǫ)K+1
)
,
as claimed.
QED
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5.2 Deviations from truthfulness in the Exponential Mechanism
We bound the potential gain of an agent located at ti who reports bi:
Lemma 11 Using the Exponential Mechanism for the facility location problem, if ǫ ≤ 1 then for
any i, any bi, ti ∈ Ti and any t−i ∈ T−i,
E
M
ǫ
2 (bi,t−i)
[ui(ti, s, ri(ti, s))]− EM ǫ2 (ti,t−i)[ui(ti, s, ri(ti, s))] ≤ 2ǫ|ti − bi|.
Proof: By Lemma 8, |F (bi, t−i, s)−F (ti, t−i, s)| ≤ 1n |ti− bi|. Plugging this into the definition
of the Exponential Mechanism we get:
E
M
ǫ
2 (bi,t−i)
[ui(ti, s, ri(ti, s)] =
∫
s∈S
ui(ti, s, ri(ti, s)) dM
ǫ
2 (bi, t−i)(s)
=
∫
s∈S
ui(ti, s, ri(ti, s))
e
nǫ
2
F (bi,t−i,s)∫
s′∈S e
nǫ
2
F (bi,t−i,s′) ds′
ds
≤
∫
s∈S
ui(ti, s, ri(ti, s))
e
nǫ
2
(
F (ti,t−i,s)+
|ti−bi|
n
)
∫
s′∈S e
nǫ
2
(
F (ti,t−i,s′)− |ti−bi|n
)
ds′
ds
= eǫ|ti−bi|
∫
s∈S
ui(ti, s, ri(ti, s)) dM
ǫ
2 (ti, t−i)(s)
= eǫ|ti−bi|E
M
ǫ
2 (ti,t−i)
[ui(ti, s, ri(ti, s)],
The proof is completed by noting that as |ti − bi| ≤ 1 and ǫ < 1, eǫ|ti−bi| ≤ 1 + 2ǫ|ti − bi|.
QED
5.3 A commitment mechanism
Consider a commitment mechanism induced by the following distribution P over the set S =
[0, 1]K : First, choose a uniformly a random integer X ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , m¯}, where the parameter m¯
will be set below. Next choose a number Y , randomly and uniformly, from the interval [0, 2X − 1].
Now let s be the alternative where one facility is located at Y
2X
and the other K − 1 facilities at
Y+1
2X
.
Lemma 12 If |bi − ti| ≥ 2−(m¯−1) then EMP (ti,t−i)[ui(ti, s)] ≥ EMP (bi,t−i)[ui(ti, s)] + |ti−bi|
2
8m¯
.
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Proof: We first consider the case bi ≤ ti−2−(m¯−1). AssumeX and Y are chosen such that 12X <
|ti−bi|
2
≤ 2
2X
and Y
2X
∈ [bi, bi+ti2 ]. As a result the facility assigned to i, whenever she announces bi
is located at Y
2X
. However, if she announces her true location, ti, she is assigned a facility located
at Y+1
2X
. Consequently, ui(ti, s, ri(ti, s)) ≥ ui(ti, s, ri(bi, s)) + 12X ≥ ui(ti, s, ri(bi, s)) + (ti−bi)4 . In
words, for the specific choice of X and Y misreporting one’s type leads to a loss exceeding (ti−bi)
4
.
The probability of choosing the unique X satisfying 1
2X
< |ti−bi|
2
≤ 2
2X
is 1/m¯. Conditional on
this event, the probability of choosing Y satisfying Y
2X
∈ [bi, bi+ti2 ] is (ti−bi)2 . Since the mechanism
is imposing, then for an arbitrary choice of X and Y misreporting is not profitable. Therefore, the
expected loss from misreporting exceeds |ti−bi|
2
8m¯
.
The proof of the complementary case, bi ≥ ti+2−(m¯−1), uses similar arguments and is omitted.
QED
5.4 Implementation in undominated strategies
As in the generic construction, let M¯ ǫq (t) = (1−q)M
ǫ
2 (t)+qMP (t). Note that whenever q |ti−bi|
2
8m¯
≥
2ǫ|ti− bi| being truthful dominates any announcement satisfying |bi− ti| ≥ 2−(m¯−1). In particular,
this holds whenever q ≥ 16ǫm¯2m¯.
Set ǫ = 1
n2/3
√
K + 1, m¯ = ⌈log
(
n1/3
6
√
K+1 lnn
)
⌉, and q = 16ǫm¯2m¯ and denote by MˆLOC3 = M¯ ǫq
for this choice of parameters.
Theorem 3 There exists n0 = n0(K) such that MˆLOC3 32
√
K+1
n1/3
lnn-implements F in undomi-
nated strategies for all n > n0.
Proof: We first observe that as there exists nq = nq(K) such that q < 1 for all n > nq and
hence the mechanism is well defined. This also implies that for agent i reporting bi such that
|bi − ti| ≥ 2−(m¯−1) is dominated by reporting ti. Similarly, there exists nα = nα(K) such that
α = 2
nǫ
ln
(
e+ (nǫ)K+1
) ≤ 0.5 for all n > nα as required in the proof of Corollary 6. Finally,
there exists nm¯ = nm¯(K) such that m¯ ≤ lnn for all n > nm¯. In the following we will assume that
n > max(nq, nα, nm¯).
There are two sources for the additive error for MˆLOC3:
1. The commitment mechanism introduces an additive error of at most q = 8ǫm¯2m¯. Noting
that 2m¯ ≤ 2 · n1/3
6
√
K+1 lnn
and substituting for ǫ we get that q ≤ 8
3
lnn
n1/3
≤ 2
√
K+1
n1/3
lnn.
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2. The exponential mechanism introduces an additive error of 2
2−(m¯−1)
+ 6
nǫ
ln
(
e+ (nǫ)K+1
)
(see Lemma 10). Note that 6
nǫ
ln
(
e+ (nǫ)K+1
) ≤ 6(K+1)
nǫ
ln (e+ nǫ) and substituting for ǫ,
we get that there exists n1 = n1(K) such that for all n > n1 this additive error is bounded
by 2
2−(m¯−1)
+ 6
√
K+1
n1/3
lnn. In addition 2m¯−1 = 1
2
· 2m¯ ≥ 1
2
n1/3
6
√
K+1 lnn
which implies that the
error is bounded by 4 · 6
√
K+1
n1/3
lnn+ 6
√
K+1
n1/3
lnn = 30
√
K+1
n1/3
lnn.
Setting n0 = max(nq, nα, nm¯, n1), we get that for all n > n0 the total additive error is bounded
by
2
√
K + 1
n1/3
lnn+
30
√
K + 1
n1/3
lnn =
32
√
K + 1
n1/3
lnn.
QED
6 Discussion
The mechanisms proposed in this paper are based on two pillars – a differentially private mecha-
nism on the one hand and an imposing mechanism on the other hand. In the following we discuss
the importance of each of these pillars for the results obtained. In addition, we discuss some of the
limitations of our results.
6.1 Is differential privacy sufficient?
McSherry and Talwar [22] observed that differential privacy is sufficient to yield approximate
implementation in ǫ-dominant strategies. However, as we show below, differential privacy does
not generally imply implementation with a stronger solution concept.
Our example is a pricing mechanism that utilizes the exponential mechanism and hence yields
an ǫ-dominant implementation that (assuming parties act truthfully) well approximates the optimal
revenue. However, there are dominant strategies in the example that involve mis-representation
and lead to a significantly inferior revenue.
Example 2 Consider a monopolist producing an unlimited supply digital good who faces n buy-
ers, each having a unit demand at a valuation that is either 0.5 + µ or 1 + µ where 0 < µ < 0.5.
The monopolist cannot distinguish among buyers and is restricted to choosing a price in the set
{0.5, 1}. Assume the monopolist is interested in maximizing the average revenue per buyer.17 The
optimal outcome for the auctioneer is hence
OPT (t¯) =
maxs∈{0.5,1}(s · |{i : ti ≥ s}|)
n
.
17We consider the average revenue per buyer as the objective function, instead of the total revenue, in order to
comply with the requirement that the value of the objective function is restricted to the unit interval.
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If the monopolist uses the appropriate exponential mechanism then it is ǫ-dominant for agents
to announce their valuation truthfully, resulting in an almost optimal revenue. However, one should
note that the probability that the exponential mechanism will choose the lower of the two prices
increases with the number buyers that announce 0.5. Hence, it is dominant for buyers to announce
0.5. This may lead to inferior results. In particular, whenever all agents value the good at 1 but
announce 0.5 the mechanism will choose the price 0.5 with high probability, leading to an average
revenue of 0.5 per buyer, which is half the optimal revenue per buyer.
6.2 Is imposition sufficient?
It is tempting to think that our notion of imposition trivializes the result, i.e., that, regardless of
the usage of a differentially-private mechanism, the ability to force agents to react sub-optimally,
according to their announced types, already inflicts sufficient disutility that would deter untruthful
announcements. The next example demonstrates that such a naive imposition is generally insuffi-
cient. Intuitively, the reason is that for inducing both truthfulness and efficiency, one needs a strong
bound on an agent’s benefit from mis-reporting: the utility from mis-reporting should be smaller
from the disutility from being committed to a sub-optimal reaction.
Example 3 Consider a digital goods pricing problem with n agents, where the valuation of each
agent is either 1
n
or 1 + µ, and the possible prices are 1
n
and 1. In this example the optimal price
is 1 whenever there exists an agent of type 1 + µ, µ < 0.5.
Consider the following mechanism: with high probability it implements the optimal price and
with a low probability it uses an imposing mechanism. Note that the strategy to always announce a
valuation of 1
n
is a Nash equilibrium. This announcement is clearly optimal if an agent’s valuation
is indeed 1
n
. If an agent’s valuation, on the other hand, is 1 + µ, then complying with this strategy
will result in a utility that is almost 1, whereas deviating to truthful announcement will result in a
price of 1 with high probability, hence a utility of µ.
Therefore, the monopolist’s average revenue from a buyer is always 1
n
. This is substantially
inferior to the optimal outcome, which could be as high as 1, whenever all agents are of the high
type.
The Nash equilibrium from example 3 survives even if we modify the mechanism to be fully
imposing (i.e, it always imposes the optimal reaction). Thus, the above mentioned sub-optimality
holds.
We believe that the notion of imposition is natural in many settings, and that to some extent
imposition is already implicitly integrated into the mechanism design literature. In fact, any mech-
anism that is not ex-post individually rational imposes its outcome on the players: it imposes
participation and ignores the possibility players have to ‘walk away’ once the results are known.
Moreover, models that involve transfers treat these as imposed reactions: once the social choice
and transfers are determined, players must comply (consider taxation and auction payments as an
example).
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6.3 Model Limitations
There are three overarching limitations to the technique we present: (1) The generic mechanism
only works for objective functions which are not sensitive, (2) We consider settings where the
reaction set of agents is rich enough, such that any pair of types can be separated by the optimal
reaction on at least one social alternative; and (3) The size of the set of social alternatives cannot
grow too fast as the set of agents grows. We discuss these below.
6.3.1 Low sensitivity of the objective function
Many objective functions of interest are actually insensitive and comply with our requirements.
Revenue in the setting of digital goods, and social welfare (i.e., sum of agents’ valuations) are
typical examples. We note that although we focused our attention on social functions whose sen-
sitivity is constant (independent of n), one can apply Theorem 2 also in the case where d = d(n)
as long as d(n)
n
→ 0 as n→∞.
There are, however, important settings where the objective function is sensitive and hence our
techniques cannot be applied. An important example is that of revenue maximization in a single
unit auction – it is easy to come up with extreme settings where a change in a type of a single agent
can drastically change the revenue outcome. Consider, e.g. the case where all agents value the
good at zero, resulting in a maximal revenue of zero. A unilateral change in the valuation of any
single agent from zero to one will change the maximal revenue from zero to one as well.
However, even in this case the domain of type profiles (valuation profiles) that demonstrate
sensitivity is quite small – for instance, if agents valuations are taken uniformly from [0, 1] then
although the worst-case sensitivity of the maximal revenue is 1, the ’typical’ sensitivity would be
of order 1/n. In this case, the work of Nissim et al. [24] may turn to be applicable, as it yields
differentially private mechanisms where the deviation from the maximum depends on a local notion
of sensitivity called smooth sensitivity. We leave the examination of this approach to future work.
6.3.2 Rich reaction set
The second limitation is the requirement that agents’ reaction sets are sufficiently rich. In fact,
what we need for the results to hold is that for any pair of types of an agent there exists some social
alternative for which the set of optimal reactions for the first type is disjoint of the set of optimal
reactions for the second type. For example, in an auction setting, we require that for each pair of
agents’ valuations the auctioneer can propose a price such that one type will buy the good, while
the other will refuse.
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6.3.3 Small number of social alternatives
The approximation accuracy we achieve in Theorem 2 is proportional to
√
ln(np˜|S|)
p˜n
. Note that
p˜ > 1/|S|. A naive use of the theorem yields accuracy O(|S| lnn/n), yielding meaningful ap-
proximation as long as |S| (as a function of n) grows slower than n/ lnn.
As we have demonstrated in sections 4.2, one can sometimes design a commitment mechanism
realizing a much bigger p˜, ideally independent of |S|. If that is the case, then Theorem 2 yields
approximation error O(
√
ln(n|S|)
n
), allowing the number of social alternatives to be as high as an
exponential function of the number of agents. For larger S, the approximation error may not
vanish as n increases. Two interesting examples for such settings are matching problems, where
each social alternative specifies the list of pairs, and multi unit auctions where the number of goods
is half the number of bidders.
6.4 Alternative mechanisms
The framework we presented combines a differentially private mechanism with an imposing one.
Our general results refer to a ‘universal’ construction of an imposing mechanism (the uniform one),
yet the specific examples we analyze demonstrate that imposing mechanisms that are tailor made
to the specific setting can improve upon the results.
Similarly, it is not imperative to use the Exponential mechanism as the first component, and
other differentially-private mechanisms may be adequate. In fact, the literature on differential
privacy provides various alternatives that may outperform the Exponential mechanism, given a
specific context. Some examples can be found in Dwork et al. [12], where the mechanism has a
noisy component that is calibrated to global sensitivity, or in Nissim et al. [24] where a similar
noisy component is calibrated to smooth sensitivity. The latter work also uses random sampling to
achieve similar properties. To learn more the reader is referred to the recent survey of Dwork [11].
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